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A LITTLE LIGHT ON THE MAYO: A METHOD FOR OVERTURNING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S
LATEST ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY DECISION
Kevin J. Georgek*
I. INTRODUCTION
Patents grant their owners the right to exclude others from practicing a claimed invention for
a limited time.1 Whether patents actually protect the economic interests of their owners, provide
incentive for innovation, and foster economic growth has been extensively debated.2 There are
undisputedly, however, times when the same patents that may protect an entity’s exclusive
interest in a claimed invention—to an important, lifesaving therapy for instance—simultaneously
deprive others of access to that very invention resulting in significant harm to those excluded.3
Precedent indicates, and policy dictates, that when awarding a patent could inhibit subsequent
advances in a given field to the detriment of researchers and patients, a modification to the
traditional calculus for determining whether subject matter is patent-eligible is warranted. 4 This
modification involves broadening the scope of appropriate considerations to encompass extrastatutory concerns.

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
1
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Boomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (defining a patent as a franchise
granting “the right to exclude everyone from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of
the patentee”).
2
See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 111, 116–17 (2010) (asserting that patents afford inventors—particularly small firms and
individuals—a degree of insulation from competitors who seek to sell the same invention at a lower price in the
marketplace and that this protection from competition spurs innovation by enabling inventors to recover
development costs without fearing that competitors will unduly benefit from their innovative ideas); see also
Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
130, 131 (2009) (offering empirical data to debunk the “orthodox assumption that technological innovation can be
encouraged through the prospect of patent protection”).
3
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 188–89 (2010),
rev'd, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (listing parties who face prohibitive costs of obtaining BRCA1 and BRCA2
genetic testing as a result of their insurance companies’ failure to cover the cost of testing and by their inability to
pursue alternative testing or obtain second opinions on test results since the patent holder is the only provider of
testing services in the United States.).
4
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).

1

The merits of gene patenting and the broader issue of subject matter eligibility generally
have been at the center of many recent debates.5 This Comment seeks to provide an overview of
subject matter eligibility jurisprudence leading up to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit’s (hereinafter “Federal Circuit”) latest decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v.
United States Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter “Association for Molecular
Pathology”).6 It also suggests that the Supreme Court—by granting certiorari in this case on the
question of whether human genes are patentable—has an opportunity to clarify the appropriate
analysis for determining whether the subject matter at issue in Association for Molecular
Pathology is patent-eligible. Part II of this Comment provides a historical perspective into the
development of modern subject matter eligibility jurisprudence and details the approach the
Supreme Court adopted in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. (hereinafter
“Mayo”),7 a recent case concerning patent eligibility.

Part III discusses Association for

Molecular Pathology and details the method for determining patent eligibility that the Federal
Circuit advanced in that case. Part IV argues that the Federal Circuit erred in its dismissive
treatment of the effect of Mayo on Association for Molecular Pathology because neither
Supreme Court nor Federal Circuit precedent supports the Federal Circuit’s treatment of different
claim types in isolation. Accordingly, this section describes three opinions from Supreme Court
and Federal Circuit precedent which explicitly recognize that concerns raised in the context of

5

See Christopher M. Holman, Will Gene Patents Derail the Next Generation of Genetic Technologies?: A
Reassessment of the Evidence Suggests Not, 80 UMKC L. REV. 563, (2012); Abigail Lauer, Comment, The
Disparate Effects of Gene Patents on Different Categories of Scientific Research, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179,
(2011); W. Nicholson Price II, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole Genome Sequencing and
Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1601, (2012).
6
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Given
the extensive procedural history of this case, a point of clarification at this juncture is warranted. Whenever this
Comment refers to “Association for Molecular Pathology” it is discussing the case cited at the beginning of this
footnote—the Federal Circuit’s second opinion in the case following remand by the Supreme Court.
7
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
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one type of patent claim are applicable in the context of different claim types.8 Part IV will also
discuss the Supreme Court’s repeated disinclination to adhere to rigid tests promulgated by the
Federal Circuit in favor of more nuanced and holistic analyses—particularly in the areas of
subject matter eligibility and obviousness. Part V discusses the Supreme Court’s grant of
certiorari in Association for Molecular Pathology on the question of whether human genes are
patentable and predicts that the Court will answer this question in the negative after carefully
weighing policy considerations when analyzing patent eligibility. Part VI briefly addresses
Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the Federal Circuit’s rationale for its dismissive
treatment of Mayo contravenes Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent which dictates that
the reservations the Court expressed in refusing to uphold Mayo’s method claims are applicable
to the composition claims in Association for Molecular Pathology. Additionally, important
policy considerations including the harmful effects of Myriad’s patents on genetic research, test
quality, and patient access to testing, compel the conclusion that Myriad’s claims to isolated
BRCA1 and BRCA2 (BRCA1/2) should be rendered ineligible for patent protection. Finally, the
Supreme Court’s consistent skepticism of strict tests promulgated by the Federal Circuit, and the
Supreme Court’s decision to address the broad question of whether human genes are patentable
on certiorari,9 signal that the Court will not limit its analysis of patent eligibility to the text of the
statute, but rather will weigh important extra-statutory concerns into the subject matter eligibility
analysis.

8

See F. SCOTT KIEFF, PAULINE NEWMAN, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & HENRY E. SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW
92–95 (Robert C. Clark et. al. eds., 5th ed. 2011) (noting that patent claims are primarily characterized as one of five
types including: composition, process (or method), apparatus, product-by-process, or means-plus-function).
9
See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398).

3

II. PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Early Cases
The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with the power “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective . . . Discoveries.”10 Congress, in turn, codified laws governing the award of
these exclusive rights in Title 35 of the United States Code.11 The types of discoveries that are
entitled to receive this protection are described in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“section 101”), which reads:
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”12 While this language has often been
interpreted broadly,13 courts have nonetheless consistently recognized implicit limitations to the
scope of patentable subject matter, often stating that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas are not patentable.14
Nature’s handiwork is not patent-eligible.15 Manifestations of the laws of nature such as
“the heat of the sun, electricity, [and] the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of

10

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
12
Id.
13
See infra notes 186 and accompanying text.
14
Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (awarding a patent for a process of curing synthetic rubber
which, despite employing a well-known mathematical formula, applied it in a process that when considered as a
whole is patent-eligible), and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (upholding the award of a patent
directed to a live, human-made microorganism capable of breaking down crude oil—a property that no naturally
occurring bacteria possess), with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (holding that a formula for computing
alarm limits—absent any disclosure relating to the chemical processes employed, the method for monitoring
variables, or the means of setting off the alarm—was not patent-eligible), and Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175
(1852) (“A principle . . . is a fundamental truth . . . [which] cannot be patented, as no one can claim in . . . them an
exclusive right.”).
15
See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
11
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knowledge of all men . . . and [are] reserved exclusively to none.”16

Material derived from

natural sources which is then transformed or reduced into a form that possess characteristics
markedly different17 from those of the material as it exists in nature, however, has long been
recognized by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as patent-eligible.18
While the precise boundaries of what constitutes “markedly different” subject matter remain
unclear, the Federal Circuit defined a “markedly different” molecule as one that has “a distinct[]
chemical structure and identity” from naturally occurring molecules.19
While section 101 does not, on its face, declare living matter patent-eligible, the Plant
Patents Act of 1930—which declared that plants were eligible for patenting if they could be
reproduced asexually—broadened the scope of patentable subject matter to include a form of
living matter that had not undergone an extraction or a purification step, but that existed purely
in its natural form.20 The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 also recognized that certain forms
of live plants were eligible for protection but explicitly declared that bacteria were outside the
scope of the Act.21 Bacteria were shortly thereafter determined to be within the scope of patenteligible subject matter, provided that they displayed “markedly different characteristics from any
16

Id. at 130.
Although the precise threshold beyond which a composition becomes “markedly different” than any naturally
existing composition remains elusive, the Federal Circuit illustrated by way of analogy to case law that it lies
somewhere between non-markedly different combinations of existing molecules and markedly different genetically
engineered molecules. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
18
See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908) (stating that in order to
overcome the bar on patenting products of nature, an inventor must prove that the product for which he seeks a
patent has become a new and distinct article with new characteristics or uses); Park-Davis & Co. v. Mulford & Co.,
196 F. 496, 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (holding that patents claiming a derivative of crystalline adrenaline, extracted from
suprarenal tissue in animals for use as an agent to increase blood pressure, were valid); U.S. Patent #135,245
(claiming a form of brewer’s yeast “free from organic germs of disease”—despite the fact that brewer’s yeast
existed in nature—which could be used to brew beer that was easier to preserve).
19
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1328 (2012).
20
Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§
161–64 (2006)).
21
Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1930) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. §§
2321–2583 (2006)) (“The breeder of any sexually or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria)
who has so reproduced the variety . . . shall be entitled to plant variety protection for the variety . . . .”).
17
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[bacteria] found in nature.”22 The prohibition on patenting laws of nature, natural phenomenon,
and abstract ideas standing alone also encompasses methods and processes that include this
subject matter within their scope.23 Such subject matter is only eligible for patenting if, when
considered as a whole, the patent describes an application of the law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea and does not simply attempt to claim the naturally existing subject
matter itself.24
Currently, the USPTO characterizes isolated DNA that encodes specific genes as patenteligible subject matter.25

The USPTO’s Utility Examination Guidelines instruct that “an

inventor’s discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent on the genetic composition isolated
from its natural state and processed through purifying steps that separate the gene from other
molecules naturally associated with it.”26 While these Guidelines do not have the binding effect
of law, they nevertheless remain influential in that a reviewing court may defer to the agency’s
interpretation of a statute it oversees.27 Despite their influence, however, the scope of the rights
the Guidelines confer to a patent holder remains unclear.28
In addition to its reliance on the USPTO’s Utility Examination Guidelines, the Federal
Circuit—in determining that the isolated DNA at issue in Association for Molecular Pathology

22

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
See infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
24
See infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
25
See Eric J. Rogers, Comment, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 19, 28
(2010).
26
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Dep’t of Commerce, RIN 0651-AB09, UTILITY EXAMINATION GUIDELINES
(2001).
27
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1325 (2012); In re
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (referring to the Utility Examination Guidelines).
28
See Peter Edwards, Comment, AMP v. Myriad: The Future of Medicine and Patent Law, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 811, 818 (2011) (noting the lack of clarity in the language of the Guidelines which provides that while the
holder of a gene patent has the right to exclude others from using that gene, the patent holder must also promote
discovery of other uses of the gene by other researchers. The Guidelines’ lack of clarity is also evident in the
language which instructs that while genes are patentable, neither the DNA sequences nor the underlying genetic
information are patentable. Edwards notes that “it is not clear what the researcher is patenting in a gene, however, if
not genetic information”).
23
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was patent-eligible—acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co. and Diamond v. Chakrabarty “set out the primary framework for deciding
the patent eligibility of compositions of matter, including isolated DNA molecules.”29 As such, a
detailed discussion of these cases is warranted.
In 1948, the Supreme Court weighed in on the distinction between patent-eligible subject
matter and unpatentable products of nature in Funk Bros.30 Kalo initiated a lawsuit against Funk
Bros. alleging that Funk Bros. infringed Kalo’s patent for a bacterial inoculant31 for use with
leguminous plants.32 Prior to the invention, in order to optimize legume growth, farmers were
required to select the optimal strain of bacteria from a group of at least six species which
corresponded with their desired legume.33 Mixed bacterial cultures largely proved ineffective
because the bacteria, when mixed, produced inhibitory effects on each other resulting in reduced
levels of plant growth.34 The invention in this case was a mixture of Rhizobium bacteria that did
not display the commonly observed inhibitory effects of each other on legumes.35 The Supreme
Court acknowledged that the inventor “[did] not create [the] state of inhibition or of noninhibition in the bacteria.”36 As justification for the Court’s conclusion that “[the bacteria’s]

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1326.
.
333 U.S. 127 (1948).
31
The Court offered the following description of the challenged invention: “An inoculant for leguminous plants
comprising a plurality of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus
Rhizobium, said strains being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the leguminous
plant for which they are specific.” Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 127, n.1. An alternative explanation of the process of
bacterial inoculation can be found at:
http://www.ctahr.hawaii.edu/bnf/Downloads/Training/Legume%20use/Title.Pdf (explaining that increasing the
concentration of Rhizobia, unique bacteria that naturally exists in the soil, can result in the infection of the root hairs
of legumes. This infection results in the formation of nitrogen-fixing nodules which act as “small nitrogen
factories” that produce proteins essential for plant growth.)
32
See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 128.
33
Id. at 129 (explaining that “[n]o one species [of bacteria] will infect the roots of all species of leguminous plants.
But each [species of bacteria] will infect well-defined groups of those plants . . . . Thus if a farmer had crops of
clover, alfalfa, and soy beans he would have to use three separate inoculants”).
34
Id. at 129–30.
35
Id. at 130.
36
Id.
29
30

7

qualities are the work of nature . . . . [and] [t]hose qualities are of course not patentable,” the
Court reasoned that “the combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the
species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility.”37 The Court further
characterized the bacteria as “manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.”38
The difficult task of discerning an unpatentable product of nature from a patentable
product of human ingenuity was again before the Court in Chakrabarty.39 Ananda Chakrabarty,
a microbiologist at the General Electric Co., sought to patent a genetically engineered bacterium
that was capable of breaking down crude oil.40

The Court again recognized the limits to

patentability, stating:
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not
patentable . . . . Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in
the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his
celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.41
Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.”42
In this case, however, the Court ultimately upheld the patent, finding that “the patentee
has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in
nature and one having the potential for significant utility.

His discovery is not nature's

handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under section 101.”43 In
37

Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
Id. at 130.
39
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
40
The Court offered the following explanation of the claimed invention: “Plasmids are hereditary units physically
separate from the chromosomes of the cell. In prior research, Chakrabarty and an associate discovered that plasmids
control the oil degradation abilities of certain bacteria. In particular, the two researchers discovered plasmids
capable of degrading camphor and octane, two components of crude oil. In the work represented by the patent
application at issue here, Chakrabarty discovered a process by which four different plasmids, capable of degrading
four different oil components, could be transferred to and maintained stably in a single Pseudomonas bacterium,
which itself has no capacity for degrading oil.” Id. at 305, n.1.
41
Id. at 309.
42
Id. (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 (1948)).
43
Id. at 310.
38

8

formulating its conclusion, the Court looked in part to the Committee Reports accompanying the
1952 Patent Act, which it interpreted to instruct that Congress intended patentable subject matter
to broadly “include anything under the sun that is made by man.”44
In sum, while the patent in Funk Bros. attempted to claim a mere mixture of naturally
occurring bacteria, the patent in Chakrabarty was directed to a new bacterium which exhibited
characteristics not found in nature. Notably, the Court approached Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty
in a similar fashion; primarily relying on a comparison between the function of the claimed
invention with the function of a naturally occurring analogue.
It is not immediately apparent where Myriad’s isolated DNA fits along the spectrum
delineated by Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty. Whether the isolated DNA at issue has a “distinct
chemical structure and identity” and meets the Federal Circuit’s definition of “markedly
different” is open to debate. However, determining whether isolated BRCA1/2 DNA surpasses
illusive “markedly different” threshold is not determinative of patent eligibility. The Supreme
Court—in reviewing the issues presented in Association for Molecular Pathology on certiorari
and ultimately vacating the Federal Circuit’s ruling—declined to confine its analysis to the cases
offered by the Federal Circuit.45 Instead, on remand, the Court advised that the Federal Circuit
consider the issues in Association for Molecular Pathology in light of its recent decision in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.46—a case that recognized a more
nuanced set of criteria for determining patent eligibility than the test advanced in Funk Bros. and
Chakrabarty.47

44

Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)); see infra note 180 and
accompanying text.
45
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
46
See id.
47
See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
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B. Subject Matter Eligibility in Mayo
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. develops products that enable physicians to detect,
diagnose, and treat disorders in the fields of gastroenterology and oncology.48 It also specializes
in personalized medicine—a method of using an individual’s unique serologic, genetic, and
inflammation markers to diagnose certain disorders and predict treatment outcomes.49 The
Prometheus patents at issue in this case were directed to a method for administering thiopurine
drugs,50 one that sought to maximize the efficacy of the drugs for each individual patient by
accounting for individuals’ different rates of metabolizing thiopurines.51 The following claim in
the Prometheus patent describes the invention and is one of the claims at issue:
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immunemediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than
about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of
said drug subsequently administered to said subject and wherein the level of 6thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a
need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said
subject.52
Prometheus initiated an infringement lawsuit when Mayo Medical Laboratories (Mayo)
announced that it planned to introduce its own test—one which used slightly higher thiopurine

48

See About Prometheus, PROMETHEUSLABS.COM, http://www.prometheuslabs.com/About.asp (last visited Oct. 25,
2012).
49
See Diagnostics, PROMETHEUSPATIENTS.COM, http://www.prometheuspatients.com/Products_Diagnostics.asp (last
visited Oct. 25, 2012).
50
Thiopurines are a class of synthetic drugs used to treat immune mediated gastro-intestinal disorders including
Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis. See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (“Prometheus III”).
51
See id.
52
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); see infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
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metabolite levels to measure toxicity—to the marketplace.53

Mayo moved for summary

judgment, alleging that the Prometheus patents were invalid because they impermissibly claimed
the “correlation between the recited metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy and/or toxicity,”
which it alleged was an unpatentable “natural, observable phenomenon” and that “the patents
impermissibly preempt use of the correlation.”

54

Thus, Mayo alleged that the Prometheus

patents did not preclude them from marketing their test.55
The district court granted Mayo’s motion, finding that Prometheus’s claims reciting
correlations between thiopurine drug metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy or toxicity were
directed to natural phenomena.56 On appeal, the Federal Circuit—relying on the machine-ortransformation (M or T) test57—reversed the district court’s decision.58 As understood by the
Federal Circuit, the M or T test provided that, “a claimed process is surely patent-eligible under
section 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular
article into a different state or thing.”59

The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that

Prometheus’s method claims satisfied the M or T test and thus, were patent-eligible.60
In arriving at this conclusion, the Federal Circuit determined that the Prometheus patents fell
within the scope of section 101 because both the “administering” and “determining” steps
“‘transform an article into a different state or thing’ and this transformation ‘is central to the
purpose of the claimed process.’”61 Regarding the “administering” step, the Federal Circuit

53

Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04CV1200, 2008 WL 878910, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28,
2008), rev'd, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Prometheus II”).
54
Id. at *5 (quoting Doc. No. 502 at 11, 13).
55
See id.
56
See id. at *6, *14.
57
See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
58
See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
59
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.Cir. 2009), rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 3543
(2010) (Prometheus III) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).
60
See id. at 1350.
61
Id. at 1345 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
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recognized that “the human body necessarily undergoes a transformation [when drugs are
administered]” and dismissed “the fact that the change of the administered drug to its metabolite
relies on natural process” as dispositive of patent ineligibility.62 The court characterized the
transformation in this case as “the result of the physical administration of a drug to a subject to
transform—i.e., treat—the subject, which is itself not a natural process.”63 The Federal Circuit
also found the “determining” step of Prometheus’s claimed method to be “transformative and
central.”64 The court stated that “[d]etermining the levels of [a drug] in a subject necessarily
involves a transformation, for those levels cannot be determined by mere inspection.”65 Rather,
this determination requires a certain amount of manipulation in the form of extracting the
metabolites from the human body and determining their concentration.66 The Federal Circuit
dismissed Mayo’s additional argument that the Prometheus patents preempted a natural
phenomenon by stating that “because the claims meet the machine-or-transformation test, they
do not preempt a fundamental principle.”67

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that

Prometheus’s claims were properly directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
The Supreme Court, having re-visited the question of subject matter eligibility in its
Bilski v. Kappos decision, which it handed down the day before, granted certiorari in the Mayo
case, vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for
further consideration in light of Bilski.68 In its Bilski decision, the Supreme Court addressed the
patent eligibility of business methods.69 The claims at issue were directed to a method of risk
hedging in commodities markets which included the steps of initiating a series of transactions
62

Id. at 1346.
Id.
64
Id. at 1347.
65
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 581 F.3d at 1347.
66
See Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
67
Id. at 1349.
68
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
69
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
63
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between commodity providers and consumers who had a certain risk position, identifying market
participants for the commodity who had a corresponding counter-risk position, and initiating a
series of transactions between the commodity providers and market participants.70 The Court
ultimately determined that the claims were drawn towards the concept of hedging risk—an
unpatentable, abstract idea.71 Notably, the Court also held that the M or T test is not the sole test
for patent eligibility under section 101, but rather is a “useful and important clue, an
investigative tool” for determining patent eligibility.72 On remand, the Federal Circuit applied
largely the same analysis that it did in its first Mayo decision, again holding that the claims
recited patent-eligible subject matter under section 10173 and again relying on the M or T test to
reach that conclusion.74
On March 20, 2012, a unanimous Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, reversed the
Federal Circuit’s decision and held that Prometheus’s claims were not properly drawn to patenteligible subject matter under section 101.75 Rather, the Court determined the patents effectively
claimed ineligible laws of nature that described the relationships between levels of thiopurine
metabolites and therapeutic efficacy or toxicity.76 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court
questioned whether “the patent claims add enough to their statement of the correlations to allow
the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws.”77 The
Court, turning first to the administering step, stated that it “simply refer[ed] to the relevant

70

See id. at 3223–24.
See id. at 3231.
72
Id. at 3227.
73
See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev'd, No. 101150, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 20, 2012) (Prometheus IV).
74
See id. at 1355 (stating that Prometheus’s claimed methods “satisfy the transformation prong” of the M or T test).
75
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
76
See id. at 1305.
77
Id. at 1297.
71
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audience” namely, doctors who are familiar with using thiopurines to treat patients.78 The Court
noted that merely limiting the use of an abstract idea to a predefined technological environment
is not enough to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas.79 Turning to the
wherein clauses in the Prometheus patent on page ten supra, the Court dismissed the possibility
that they could change an unpatentable concept into a patentable application by summarily
stating that they “simply tell a doctor about the relevant natural laws . . . .”80 Finally, the Court
understood the determining step to instruct the doctor to “engage in well-understood, routine,
conventional activity.”81

The Court ultimately determined that neither the administering,

determining, nor wherein limitations standing alone or in combination “[were] sufficient to
transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those regularities.”82
The Court suggested additional justifications for its conclusion that Prometheus’s patents
were drawn to ineligible subject matter from two cases dealing with the patent eligibility of
processes using mathematical formulas which, like laws of nature, are not patentable standing
alone.83 First, the Court stated that Prometheus’s claims “present[] a case for patentability that is
weaker than Diehr’s patent-eligible claim and no stronger than Flook’s unpatentable one.”84
While Diehr and Flook have proven difficult to reconcile,85 developing a complete
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See id. at 1291 (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
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Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1291 (2012).
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the method researchers did not know of the precise correlation between thiopurine metabolite levels and the
efficacy or toxicity of the drugs, they knew of the relationship).
82
See id.
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See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1292.
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Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011) (noting that the claims in Diehr and Flook are “exactly
parallel”); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other
Computer Program Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1104 (“[P]ost-Benson case law is replete with
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understanding of the Court’s rationale for its holding in Mayo requires a closer examination of
these cases.
In Parker v. Flook, the Court considered the validity of a patent directed to a method for
updating alarm limits for a catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons in which the only
point of novelty over prior, well known methods for changing alarm limits86 was the inventor’s
employment of a mathematical formula.87 The entire process consisted of essentially three steps
including “an initial step which merely measures the present value of the process variable (e.g.,
the temperature); an intermediate step which uses an algorithm to calculate an updated alarmlimit value; and a final step in which the actual alarm limit is adjusted to the updated value.”88
The Court noted that the plain language of section 101 does not instruct on whether the claimed
method—characterized only by the novel use of a mathematical formula—was patent-eligible
subject matter.89 It also acknowledged that “[t]he line between a patentable process and an
unpatentable principle is not always clear.”90

The Court stated that because mathematical

formulas are not eligible for patenting by themselves,91 the question in this case was whether
“post–solution applications of . . . a formula makes [a] method eligible for patent protection.”92
Ultimately, the Court answered its own question in the negative, characterizing the claimed
process as accomplishing nothing more than “provid[ing] a[n unpatentable] formula for
computing an updated alarm limit.”93
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See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (offering an explanation of an alarm limit as a predetermined
number that, when exceeded by certain process variables such as pressure and temperature during the process of
catalytic conversion, signals either irregularities in the process or the presence of potential dangers).
87
See id. at 586–87.
88
Id. at 585.
89
Id. at 588.
90
Id. at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 585 (“In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 93 S. Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d 273, we held that the discovery of a
novel and useful mathematical formula may not be patented.”).
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Id. (emphasis added).
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Parker, 437 U.S. at 586.
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Three years after the Court decided Flook, it was again tasked with determining the
patent eligibility of a process which employed a mathematical equation.94 The claimed process
was a method for curing rubber which involved instruments that continuously monitored the
temperature inside a mold cavity, transmitted the information to a digital computer which
employed the Arrhenius equation95 and made continuous adjustments to the cure time, and sent
signals to open the mold at the appropriate time.96 Unlike in Flook, the Diehr patent did not
attempt to claim a well-known equation itself, nor did it seek to preempt further use of that
equation. Rather, the applicants sought only “to foreclose from others the use of that equation in
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process.”97 The Court held that the
claimed process was patent-eligible, stating that it did “not view [the] claims as an attempt to
patent a mathematical formula, but rather to [claim] an industrial process for the molding of
rubber products . . . .”98 In sum, the Court stated that its opinions in Flook and Diehr were
consistent with the Court’s general position that “simply appending conventional steps, specified
at a high level of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot
make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”99
As a final justification for its holding in Mayo, the Court recognized that its subject
matter eligibility jurisprudence has “repeatedly emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not
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See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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log of the total required cure time, v; C is the activation constant, Z is the temperature in the mold, and x is a
constant dependent on the geometry of the mold in the press).
96
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inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature and the like.”100
The Court was concerned that “because [natural] laws and principles are ‘the basic tools of
scientific and technological work,’ there is a danger that granting patents that tie up their use will
inhibit future innovation . . . .”101 Prometheus’s claims implicated this concern because “telling a
doctor to measure metabolite levels and to consider the resulting measurements in light of the
correlations they describe . . . tie[s] up his subsequent treatment decision regardless of whether
he changes his dosage in the light of the inference he draws using the correlations.”102 The Court
clearly expressed a concern that declaring Prometheus’s claims eligible for patenting would
impede the development of subsequent treatment methods that combine Prometheus’s claimed
correlations with other discoveries.103 Therefore, importantly, the Supreme Court’s holding in
Mayo is founded on considerations external to the minimal requirements enumerated in section
101. Mayo provides that courts seeking to make a determination regarding patent eligibility
should not only consider the invention in light of section101 and cases that have interpreted the
statute, but they should also engage in a separate analysis whereby they weigh considerations of
the harm that could stem from tying up the use of natural laws and inhibiting discovery in a field
into the calculus for determining whether certain subject matter is patent-eligible.
III. ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF
MAYO
Mayo has already proven impactful—and likely stands to play an even greater role in the
near future—as courts struggle to develop consistent standards in the subject matter eligibility
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arena. Its influence was felt, although minimally, in Association for Molecular Pathology—a
highly publicized104 case and the latest chapter in the gene patent debate.
In the mid-1990s, researchers confirmed that mutations in the BRCA1/2 genes105
correlated with an increased risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer.106 Women who inherit
these genetic mutations face up to an eighty five percent risk of breast cancer—the second
leading cause of cancer related death among women in the United States—and up to a fifty
percent risk of ovarian cancer.107 BRCA1 mutations have also been linked with cancers of the
cervix, uterus, pancreas, and colon while BRCA2 mutations have been observed to increase the
risk of developing pancreatic and stomach cancer as well as melanoma.108 Male carriers of the
BRCA1/2 mutation face an increased risk of breast and prostate cancer.109 Determining the
existence of BRCA1/2 mutations is a critically important diagnostic and preventative tool.110
Aside from the benefits that stem from an individual’s ability to make informed decisions
relating to aspects of their life ranging from daily activities to family planning, knowledge of
BRCA1/2 mutations enables doctors to tailor the most effective treatment regimens for each
individual patient—selecting from minimally intrusive options such as increased surveillance
and monitoring, to more aggressive forms of treatment like chemotherapy.111
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See, e.g., Brent Kendall, Court Rules Biotech Firm Can Patent Human Genes, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2012),
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In September 1994, Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad)—based on its work in conjunction
with researchers at the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences, the University of
Utah, McGill University, and Eli Lilly Co.—sequenced the BRCA1 gene and sought to patent
it.112 By the end of 1995, Myriad filed for patents on the BRCA2 gene following its work with
scientists in Canada and at the University of Pennsylvania.113 As the sole licensee114 of the
patents related to the BRCA1/2 genes, Myriad controls all research and testing on or associated
with the genes115 and, as the benefactor of a limited monopoly, charges inflated prices for the
test.116 In addition, Myriad has aggressively prohibited other labs from performing its patented
test117 and generally refuses to grant licenses for second opinion diagnostic testing.118 Studies
indicate that this exclusivity impedes research and hinders the development of improvements to
testing.119
Myriad’s seven patents contained a total of fifteen composition and method claims.120
The composition claims are directed to three different types of isolated DNA molecules
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including: (1) isolated DNA sequences—identical to naturally occurring sequences—
encompassing the full length gene sequence; (2) shorter isolated sequences of DNA—measuring
as short as fifteen nucleotides; and (3) cDNA molecules which are distinct from the naturally
occurring sequences in that their non-coding segments have been removed and they are
complimentary to naturally occurring DNA.121

Claims 1 and 5 in Patent 5,747,282 are

representative of the composition claims at issue in this case and recite: “1. An isolated DNA
coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in
SEQ ID NO: 2 . . . 5. An isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1 . . .
.”122 Isolated DNA is often an essential element in many procedures to diagnose diseases and
detect genetic disorders.123
In response to the restrictive licensing and high costs of obtaining BRCA1/2 tests, The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), The Association for Molecular Pathology, several nonprofit women’s organizations, research scientists, and individuals initiated a lawsuit in 2010
challenging the validity of Myriad’s patents in the Southern District of New York.124 In a
departure from what was the common practice of upholding gene patents, Judge Sweet—
emphasizing the similarity between the function of isolated genes and native DNA as carriers of
information125—determined that Myriad’s composition and method claims impermissibly sought
to patent ineligible products of nature under 35 U.S.C. § 101.126 Judge Sweet, in an effort to
differentiate isolated DNA from other chemical compounds that were the subjects of previous
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patents,127 pointed to the dual nature of DNA—acknowledging that it is both a chemical
compound, but also a physical carrier of genetic information.128 Judge Sweet further declared
that Myriad’s diagnostic method claims were invalid because they claimed a comparison—an
unpatentable mental process—of genetic sequences to determine if differences existed.129
Myriad appealed to the Federal Circuit, which issued its first ruling in the case on July
29, 2011.130 Judge Lourie, in his majority opinion, looked to the framework for determining
patent eligibility set out in Funk Bros. and Chakrabarthy, which asked whether the subject
matter at issue was “markedly different”131 from that which exists in nature.132 Judge Lourie—
concluding that Myriad’s isolated DNA met this minimum standard and were patent-eligible—
pointed to the unique chemical structure of isolated DNA.133 He indicated that Judge Sweet
erred in determining patent eligibility based on a comparison of the function of isolated and
genomic DNA and instead urged that isolated DNA be considered a distinct chemical entity.134
Judge Lourie also cautioned against departing from the USPTO’s current practice of awarding
gene patents and advised that such a dramatic change in policy be initiated by the legislature and
not the courts.135
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Moore indicated that the difference in chemical structure
between isolated DNA and genomic DNA was not enough, by itself, to render isolated DNA
“markedly different” from genomic DNA and thus patentable per se.136 Rather, Judge Moore
engaged in a more searching inquiry, asking “whether these differences impart a new utility
which makes [isolated DNA] markedly different from nature.”137 He concluded that shorter
isolated DNA segments were clearly patent-eligible given they are particularly well-suited to
accomplish a number of tasks that genomic DNA could not accomplish.138

Judge Moore

conceded that larger isolated DNA fragments presented a more difficult question of patent
eligibility139 given that although they have the same chemical characteristics as shorter isolated
fragments, they do not retain the same utility.140 Nonetheless, Judge Moore concluded that
because Congress has generally “authorized an expansive scope of patentable subject matter,”
and the USPTO has allowed patents on isolated DNA for decades, these settled expectations of
patent law “tip[ped] the scale in favor of patentability.”141
Judge Bryson’s dissent maintained that Myriad’s composition claims were categorically
directed to unpatentable subject matter.142 In an approach similar to the one adopted by Judge
Sweet in his district court opinion, Judge Bryson’s holding was based on an understanding that
the chemical differences between isolated and genomic DNA were of secondary importance to
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the actual function of isolated and genomic DNA—which both operate to transfer information.143
Judge Bryson rebutted the majority’s reliance on USPTO precedent by pointing out that the
USPTO’s guidelines are not entitled to significant weight, as indicated by the Supreme Court’s
refusal to adhere to the guidelines—which stated that microorganisms were not patent-eligible—
at the time they decided Chakrabarty and given that the Department of Justice—which speaks
for the executive branch, to which the USPTO belongs—filed a brief taking the position that
Myriad’s composition claims were not eligible for patenting.144 Judge Bryson further raised
policy arguments in support of his determination that isolated DNA should not be patenteligible—including concerns about the preemptive force of Myriad’s broad claims on “the next
generation of innovation in genetic medicine . . . .”145
The Federal Circuit’s decision to uphold Myriad’s composition claims directed to
isolated human DNA marked a victory not only for Myriad, but also for the entire biotechnology
industry. Following the court’s decision, the ACLU petitioned the Federal Circuit to review the
decision, arguing that the court “erred in failing to consider whether the DNA fragments claimed
in these patents are products of nature.”146 When the Federal Circuit declined to accept the
petition for a rehearing, the ACLU filed a petition for writ of certiorari.147 Less than a week after
its decision in Mayo was announced, the Supreme Court granted the pending petition for a writ
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of certiorari.148 The Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case to that
court for “further consideration in light of [Mayo].”149
Although the Federal Circuit’s second Association for Molecular Pathology decision
purports to evaluate the effect of Mayo on the patent eligibility of the isolated DNA at issue in
Association for Moleculabr Pathology,150 in fact, the Federal Circuit rather glancingly
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s Mayo decision. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed
its holding that “the composition claims covering isolated DNA sequences associated with
predisposition to breast and ovarian cancers were directed to patent-eligible subject matter.”151
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT FAILED TO INCORPORATE MAYO INTO ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR
PATHOLOGY
The Federal Circuit’s primary rationale for its dismissive treatment of Mayo in evaluating
the patent eligibility of Myriad’s composition claims on remand was summed up by the court as
follows: “[t]he principal claims of the patents before us on remand relate to isolated DNA
molecules. Mayo does not control the question of patent-eligibility of such claims.”152 In other
words, the Federal Circuit largely disregarded Mayo because Mayo dealt with the patent
eligibility of method claims while the claims at issue in Association for Molecular Pathology
were directed to compositions of matter. Notably, as discussed infra, neither Supreme Court nor
Federal Circuit precedent supports the Federal Circuit’s treatment of different types of claims as
each having their own distinct set of concerns. In fact, the Court has indicated that, in the
process of determining whether certain categories of claims are eligible for patenting, it is
appropriate to draw upon concerns raised in dealing with one category of claim and consider
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
Id.
150
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151
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their applicability in the context of another type of claim. The Supreme Court’s decisions in
Gottschalk v. Benson and Bilski v. Kappos are illustrative of the Court’s practice of applying
concerns across claim types.153
The claimed invention in Benson was a “method for converting binary coded decimal
(BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.”154 The claims professed to cover any use of the
method in any apparatus or machine of any type.155 While the claims were initially rejected by
the USPTO—and then by the Board of Patent Appeals—they were upheld by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals.156 The Acting Commissioner of Patents then obtained certiorari.157
In arriving at the conclusion that a computer program—without substantial practical application
except in association with a computer—was not a patentable process, the Court repeated its
frequently expressed concern that “phenomena of nature . . . mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological
work.”158

The Court cautioned that “[upholding] the patent would wholly preempt the

mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.” 159 The
Court went on to quote its Funk Bros. decision stating, “[h]e who discovers a hitherto unknown
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes.”160 The Court
continued, stating, “[w]e dealt [in Funk Bros.] with a product claim, while the present case deals
with a process claim. But we think the same principle applies.”161
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The Court’s reasoning regarding the preemptive effect on the mathematical formula that
would result from upholding the patent in Benson is analogous to the preemptive effect on the
genetic code that would result from upholding Myriad’s composition claims. In the same way
that upholding the patent on the mathematical formula in Benson—which “ha[d] no substantial
practical application except in connection with a digital computer”—would have wholly
preempted the use of the mathematical formula, upholding Myriad’s composition claims directed
to genes—the only physical embodiments of the genetic code—would effectively preempt the
use of the genetic code.162 Thus, Benson can be read to caution against upholding patents that
would have broad preemptive effects in a field by allowing courts to impute concerns previously
attributable only to a certain type of claim and to consider them in the context of different claim
types.
Bilski, like Benson, illustrates the notion that concerns raised in the context of one type
of claim are applicable to other claim types. In attempting to clarify the plurality opinion, Justice
Stevens’s concurrence highlighted a number of perceived deficiencies in the Court’s analysis of
subject matter eligibility.163 Stevens placed the plurality’s suggestion that “the [subject matter
eligibility] analysis turns on the category of patent involved” among those deficiencies.164
Stevens, instead, maintained that “we have never in the past suggested that the [patent eligible
subject matter] inquiry varies by subject matter.”165
Finally—despite its departure from this concept in its Association for Molecular
Pathology opinion on remand—even the Federal Circuit has explicitly recognized that the scope

162

Id. at 71.
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of a 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis should not be limited by the claim type.166 In AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc., the court stated that “we consider the scope of § 101 to be the same
regardless of the form—machine or process—in which a particular claim is drafted.”167 The
court acknowledged that “the Supreme Court’s decisions in Diehr, Benson, and Flook all of
which involved method (i.e., process) claims, have provided and supported the principles which
we apply to both machine-and process- type claims.”168 The Federal Circuit went on to apply its
reasoning from two cases dealing with composition claims to the method claims at issue in the
case before it.169
Therefore, Benson, Bilski, and AT&T can be read to contravene the Federal Circuit’s
primary rationale for its dismissive treatment of Mayo—that Mayo dealt with method claims
while Association for Molecular Pathology deals with composition claims. These cases provide
clear examples of instances where courts recognized the universal applicability of the concerns
raised in the context of one type of claim and considered the implications of those concerns in
the context of another type of claim. Instead of recognizing that the concerns the Court raised in
Mayo in the context of method claims were applicable to composition claims, the Federal Circuit
ignored this instruction from precedent and chose to consider different claim types in isolation.
In arriving at its conclusion that Myriad’s isolated DNA molecules were patent-eligible,
the Federal Circuit also erred in confining its analysis to Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty170—from
which the court gleaned the “markedly different” test for determining the patent eligibility of
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Judge Moore concurring) (acknowledging that “the Prometheus discussion of laws of nature (process claims)
clearly ought to apply equally to manifestations of nature (composition claims). Myriad’s argument that
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compositions of matter.171 This error becomes apparent upon considering the Supreme Court’s
repeated disinclination to adhere to rigid tests developed by the Federal Circuit in favor of more
nuanced and holistic analyses. The dynamic between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
in two cases is indicative of the common approach employed by the Court when faced with a
decision of whether or not to adhere to a mechanical test proffered by the Federal Circuit.
For instance, as discussed earlier, the Court chose not to adopt the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive application of the M or T test to determine whether the subject matter at issue in
Prometheus’s patents was eligible for patenting.172 KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. is also
representative of the Court’s practice of declining to adhere to the rigid tests for deciding issues
of patentablity as applied by the Federal Circuit.173

Although the issue presented in KSR

concerned whether the claimed invention was obvious—another obstacle to patentability—the
Federal Circuit has explicitly weighed considerations from the obviousness context into the
calculus for determining patent eligiblity under 35 U.S.C. § 101.174 In KSR, the Supreme Court
held that the Federal Circuit’s application of the teaching, suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test
for obviousness was overly rigid, and the Court urged that any approach to deciding issues of
obviousness be flexible.175 As applied by the Federal Circuit, the TSM test was the principal
mechanism for determining whether a claimed invention was obvious by looking for a teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine certain existing inventions in a manner that yielded the
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claimed invention.176 If such a teaching, suggestion, or motivation was found, the invention
would be obvious.177
In holding that the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the TSM test in KSR was in
error, the Supreme Court stated that the Court’s precedent “set[s] forth an expansive and flexible
approach [for determining obviousness that is] inconsistent with the way the [Federal Circuit]
applied its TSM test here.”178 The Court further characterized the TSM test as a “helpful
insight,” but cautioned that “[h]elpful insights . . . need not become rigid and mandatory
formulas.”179 The Court then stated that “when a court transforms [a] general principle into a
rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the [Federal Circuit] did here, it errs.”180
Thus, Mayo and KSR demonstrate the Federal Circuit’s commitment to advancing rigid
frameworks and the Supreme Court’s repeated insistence that the tests proffered by the Federal
Circuit not be dispositive on the issues of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and
obviousness, but rather that they occupy a small portion of the calculus towards reaching a
workable conclusion. The Federal Circuit’s strict adherence to the “markedly different” test,
which it gleaned from Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty, predictably provides the Supreme Court
with yet another chance to reject the court’s narrow analysis in favor of a much more nuanced
and fact specific determination. For instance, neither Funk Bros. nor Chakrabarty analyzed the
impact of issuing a patent to the claimed invention on the public or the risk of tying up the use of
natural laws.
In Association for Molecular Pathology, the Federal Circuit went to great lengths to
divorce its decision from policy considerations. Before engaging in an analysis of whether
176
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Myriad’s composition claims directed to isolated DNA were patent-eligible, the Federal Circuit
cautioned that “it is important to state what this appeal is not about.”181 The Federal Circuit
contended that the Association for Molecular Pathology case was “not about whether individuals
suspected of having an increased risk of developing breast cancer are entitled to a second
opinion.”182 Nor was the case about “whether the . . . owner of the . . . patents, or Myriad, the
exclusive licensee . . . acted improperly in its licensing or enforcement policies with respect to
the patents.”183 The court also contended that the appeal was not about “whether it is [sic]
desirable for one company to hold a patent or license covering a test that may save people’s lives
. . . .”184 But in Mayo—which the Supreme Court intended to guide the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Association for Molecular Pathology on remand—the Court did not consider the
issue of patent eligibility in a vacuum. Rather, it examined the landscape of patent eligibility
from a position that fully accounted for the policy implications of its decision, paying particular
attention to its concern that awarding a patent may tie up the use of natural laws in an area.185
This broad view of the question of subject matter eligibility was the essence of the Court’s
holding in Mayo, and this marriage of precedent with policy is disturbingly absent from the
Federal Circuit’s first and second Association for Molecular Pathology opinions.
Finally, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the statement form Chakrabarty in support of an
extraordinarily broad scope of patent-eligible subject matter—which indicates that, “[t]he
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 [Patent] Act inform us that Congress intended
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man’”—is
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misplaced.186

The full quote from the Committee Reports teaches a far more limited

understanding of the scope of patentable subject matter. The full quote instructs that, “[a] person
may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that
is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of
[this] title are fulfilled.”187 As the Supreme Court cautioned when it heard Chakrabarty, “[t]his
[quote] is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery.”188
Had the Federal Circuit not dismissed the concerns the Supreme Court expressed in Mayo
as applicable only to method claims, and instead accounted for the implications of tying up the
use of the natural laws in the calculus for determining patent eligibility, they would likely have
concluded that Myriad’s claims to isolated DNA were not patent-eligible. The Federal Circuit
would have had to look no further than to the district court’s Association for Molecular
Pathology opinion to get a sense of the dramatic impact that awarding patents on the isolated
DNA had among patients, researchers, and other groups.189
Research has shown that gene patents have “persistent negative effects on subsequent
scientific research.”190 The possibility of obtaining patent protection for discoveries related to
genetic research largely does not motivate scientists to conduct research and as a result, “patents
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are not needed for much of U.S.-based genetic research to occur.”191 One of the primary
purposes of the U.S. patent system—full disclosure of a claimed invention—is already
accomplished by “the norms of academic science” which encourage full disclosure of research
results in peer reviewed journals.192 As much as forty six percent of labs conducting genetic
research feel that gene patents either delayed or limited their research.193 The exclusive rights
conferred by gene patents do not result in faster genetic test development nor are they necessary
for the development of genetic tests to detect rare genetic diseases.194 In fact, the discovery of
the BRCA1/2 genes was made possible by substantial funding from the National Institutes of
Health and through the use of well-known sequencing techniques by teams of scientists—some
of whom were resolutely opposed to patenting the BRCA1/2 genes.195 Some researchers have
characterized DNA patents as “difficult, if not impossible, to circumvent”196 because the patents
often foreclose research on both the effects of the DNA sequence and the naturally occurring
gene.197
Regarding the effects of gene patents on patients seeking patented therapies, research has
indicated that “where patents and licensing practices have created a sole-provider of a genetic
test, patient access to those tests has suffered in a number of ways.”198 First, when a sole-
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provider of a genetic test does not accept a patient’s insurance, the cost of obtaining the test often
proves prohibitive for large numbers of patients.199 Second, in situations where gene patents
have created a sole-provider, patients are unable to obtain an independent second opinion on test
results.200 It has been recognized that “[c]onfirmatory testing by another laboratory is the
laboratory equivalent to the time-honored practice of obtaining a second opinion from a
clinician.”201 Sole-providers of genetic tests that aggressively enforce their patents could cause
additional access problems for patients.202 In one instance, patients with familial long QT
syndrome—a life-threatening condition—were unable to receive testing for the condition for an
eighteen month period because the patent holder had not yet developed a commercial genetic test
but sought to exclude others from infringing on its patent by providing a similar test.203
Although scientists identified targeted cancer therapies effective in treating those with BRCA
mutations years ago, evidence suggests that BRCA1/2 gene patents have hindered the
availability of treatments.204
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Finally, gene patents often have deteriorative effects on genetic test quality.205

A

researcher opined that “[t]he most robust method for assuring quality in laboratory testing is
through comparison of results obtained on samples shared between different labs.”206
Competition among multiple laboratories offering genetic testing for the same indication often
acts as a catalyst for improvements in test quality and for the development of more thorough
testing techniques.207 Sample sharing and competition often do not occur in environments where
a sole-provider of a genetic test prevents others from providing testing.208 A 2006 study of 300
individuals who received negative test results from Myriad’s BRAC test, despite coming from
families comprised of individuals with four or more members that had breast or ovarian cancer,
concluded that “genetic testing does not provide all available information to women at risk . . .
[since] 12% of those from high risk families with breast/ovarian cancer and with negative . . .
commercial test results for [BRCA1/2] nonetheless carry cancer predisposing [mutations] in one
of these genes.”209 The study went on to note that because of the expense and invasiveness of
corrective procedures—such as a mastectomy—inaccurate BRCA1/2 test results coupled with a
patient’s inability to secure a second opinion can have particularly negative consequences.210
V. ESTABLISHING A WAY FORWARD
On November 30, 2012, the Supreme Court elected to grant certiorari in Association for
Molecular Pathology, following the Federal Circuit’s cursory review of the impact of Mayo on
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the issues presented in Association for Molecular Pathology.211 In agreeing to hear the case,
however, the Court chose not to review whether the Federal Circuit erred in finding Mayo and
Association for Molecular Pathology irreconcilable, nor did the Court confine itself to
addressing the issue of whether the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the validity of
Myriad’s patents.212 Rather, the Court elected to review the broadest of the three questions
raised by the petitioner, namely, “[a]re human genes patentable?”213 The fact that the question is
before the Court suggests that the answer cannot be gleaned merely from the text of § 101. As
such, the process of developing an answer to the extraordinarily broad question of whether
human genes are patentable will likely entail an extra-statutory analysis of the issues. Happily,
such an analysis should be fresh in the Court’s mind after its decision in Mayo—where, as
discussed supra, the Court carefully entertained a traditional § 101 analysis while simultaneously
stepping away from the statute to account for the policy implications of its decision—and
concluded that the Prometheus patents were not directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
Of particular concern to a unanimous Court in Mayo was the inhibitory effect that
upholding the Prometheus patents would have on subsequent developments in the field of
thiopurine administration.214

The Court noted that the patents “threaten[ed] to inhibit the

development of more refined treatment recommendations . . . that combine Prometheus's
correlations with later discovered features of metabolites, human physiology or individual patient
characteristics.” This concern applies with equal or greater force to Myriad’s BRCA1/2 patents
because while the Court emphasized that Prometheus’s patents threatened to inhibit the
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development of subsequent treatments, Myriad’s patents have already had a substantial
preemptive effect on further genetic research, genetic test development, and patient access to
testing.215
Of course, in order to use Mayo as authority permitting an extra-statutory analysis of
whether certain subject matter is patent-eligible, the Court must be satisfied that the
considerations it advanced in Mayo are not limited to method claims. Although the claims at
issue in Mayo were directed to a method of administering thiopurines, the Court made no
representations that the concerns it raised in Mayo were limited to the method claim context—
contrary to the Federal Circuit’s argument in Association for Molecular Pathology on remand.216
Instead, it is likely that the Court’s reasoning in Mayo resulted from a recognition that questions
of subject matter eligibility are often extremely complex and in some cases, a more in depth
consideration of the varied effects of upholding patents on certain subject matter is warranted.
The Court—relying primarily on Benson, Bilski, and AT&T, which all support the notion that
concerns raised in the context of one type of claim are applicable in the context of another—will
likely find Mayo is particularly applicable to the issues in Association for Molecular Pathology.
Such a finding will enable the Court to weigh the significant policy implications of affording
human genes patent protection—including the substantial preemptive effect such protection
would have on future studies of patented human genes—and will lead the Court to conclude that
human genes are not patent-eligible.
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VI. ORAL ARGUMENT PROVIDES MORE ANALOGIES THAN ANSWERS
On April 13, 2013, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Association for Molecular
Pathology.217 Notably, the Justices struggled to determine just how far removed from nature
certain subject matter has to be before it can be considered patent-eligible, using analogies to
gold made into jewelry, drugs isolated from plants in the Amazon, baseball bats carved from
trees, and eggs, flower, and salt used to make a cookie.218 These analogies underscore the
complexity of the issue before the Court.
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan expressed some concern over whether
companies like Myriad would have sufficient incentive to develop innovative new therapies
without the possibility of securing patents on products isolated from nature.219 Christopher
Hansen, arguing on behalf of the ACLU, pointed to the “enormous recognition” that companies
and innovators would receive for their discoveries.220 While Justices Scalia quipped “[w]ell,
that’s lovely” at Hanson’s rationale, Justice Kagan indicated that she hoped Hanson was going to
point to the possibility of securing method patents or use patents on technology incorporating
unpatentable natural products as sufficient incentive to encourage continued innovation.221
Some Justices indicated that they might be hesitant to reach the broad question of
whether human genes constitute patent-eligible subject matter at all. Chief Justice Roberts
observed that the Court might be asking the wrong patent question altogether and suggested that
perhaps the issue was one of obviousness—whether Myriad’s patents should fail because the
method of extracting human genes would have been obvious to any trained scientist in the
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field.222

Similarly, Justice Alito, expressing reservations about attempting to decide the broad

question of when manipulating a product of nature can transform that product into an item of
human invention, asked “why should we jump in and decide the broadest possible question?”223
Encouragingly, the Justices seemed not to be convinced by Gregory Castanias’s
suggestion on behalf of Myriad that the product of nature doctrine—which excludes products of
nature from the scope of patentable subject matter—has lost its utility in modern science.224
Castanias argued that one of the goals of personalized medicine is to more closely replicate the
natural actions of an individual’s body and that the product of nature doctrine, if read too
broadly, threatens to impede progress in this developing area of medicine.225 Justice Kennedy
indicated that merely isolating DNA does not impart additional utility into that segment absent
the addition of chemicals and tags to make it a probe and only as a probe does isolated DNA
become useful.226
Understanding that the Court’s questioning during oral argument is not always a reliable
indication of how the Court will ultimately rule, the general tenor of the oral argument left the
impression that the Justices may be hesitant to grant patent protection to isolated human genes.
The Court’s decision is expected by the end of June 2013.227
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s Mayo opinion makes clear that when the Court considers whether
human genes are patentable, it will take a broad view of the implications of its decision and
ultimately weigh the well-documented effects of tying up the use of natural laws in this area into
the calculus for determining whether this unique subject matter is patent-eligible.

The

probability that the Court will adopt this broad approach is enhanced by the Court’s explicit
recognition in Benson and Bilski that the analysis of subject matter eligibility should not be
narrowly confined to comparisons between identical claim types and by the Court’s repudiation
of the Federal Circuit’s strict adherence to inflexible standards for patent eligibility and
obviousness in Mayo and KSR, respectively. The Court is likely to conclude that human genes
are not eligible for patenting, and thus, that Myriad’s claims directed to isolated BRCA1/2 DNA
are not patent-eligible. Declining to extend patent protection to human genes will positively
impact genetic test quality, test development, and patient access to genetic tests. Importantly, it
will also provide courts with a clearer picture of the appropriate subject matter eligibility analysis
for human genes. This analysis undoubtedly requires courts to satisfy the threshold requirements
set forth in section 101, but also requires courts to engage in forward-looking considerations of
the preemptive effects of granting patent protection.

39

